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Abstract
Modern hermeneutics deals with the conditions of the possibilities of human understanding. Its contributions 
are particularly pertinent to clinical ethics, where patient and doctor seek to mutually understand one another 
in order to establish a determined care plan. Nevertheless, this approach is far from useful for the formulation 
of a concrete standard for decision making in this area. Hermeneutics is effective in putting the focus on 
dialogue, rather than method. But it overlooks the fact that dialogue, according to Gadamer, is directed 
towards truth. The present article aims to highlight this point, and seeks to establish the connection between 
this notion of truth and ideas of good, history and community.
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Resumo
Hermenêutica e a tomada de decisões em ética clínica
A hermenêutica moderna interessa-se pelas condições de possibilidade da compreensão humana. 
Indubitavelmente, os seus contributos são de interesse para a ética biomédica, na qual o médico e o paciente 
tratam de compreender-se mutuamente a fim de concretizar um determinado projeto de cuidados. No 
entanto, esta perspectiva está longe de poder ser utilizada como padrão concreto para a tomada de decisões 
neste campo. A hermenêutica tem razão ao colocar o centro de gravidade no diálogo e não no método, 
entretanto, esquece-se de que, em Gadamer, o diálogo está orientado para a verdade. É precisamente isso 
que se pretende evidenciar neste trabalho, procurando estabelecer-se a conexão entre a referida noção de 
verdade com as noções de bem, história e comunidade.
Palavras-chave: Ética clínica. Hermenêutica. Tomada de decisões.
Resumen
Hermenéutica y toma de decisiones en ética clínica
La moderna hermenéutica se interesa por las condiciones de posibilidad de la comprensión humana. Sus 
aportaciones son de indudable interés para el campo de la ética biomédica, donde médico y paciente tratan 
de comprenderse mutuamente con el fin de concretar determinado proyecto de cuidados. Sin embargo, esta 
aproximación está lejos de ser aprovechable para formar una pauta concreta de cara a la toma de decisiones 
en este campo. La hermenéutica acierta al poner el centro de gravedad en el diálogo, en lugar de en el 
método, pero olvida que, en Gadamer, el diálogo está dirigido a la verdad. Esto es lo que se tratará de poner 
de manifiesto en este trabajo, intentado establecer la conexión de dicha noción con las de bien, historia y 
comunidad.
Palabras clave: Ética clínica. Hermenéutica. Toma de decisiones.
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The present work analyzes the contribution 
of the hermeneutical approach to clinical ethics, 
particularly in relation to decision making in the 
field. Initially, the question is posed as to whether 
it is possible to form some kind of methodological 
system from hermeneutics (section 1). Faced with 
the difficulties of doing so, the attention of the study 
then turns to the tool of dialogue. This idea plays a 
prominent role in all hermeneutic approaches, but 
without an ontological base, one wonders to what 
extent the dialogue between doctor and patient 
makes sense. This question is addressed in sections 2 
and 3. Finally, we consider if the humanistic training 
provided by the moral sciences may have some 
role in decision-making and under what conditions 
(section 4).
The problem of interpretation
As Gadamer points out, health is a hidden 
concept. It is a state of internal measurement that 
is not easily determined through simple objective 
evaluation. It is vital, therefore, to observe and 
listen to patients 1. For K. M. Hunter, the patient 
comes to resemble a ‘text’ to be understood by the 
doctor. From determined data – the patient’s main 
complaint, other symptoms, the clinical signs, the 
results of tests – the doctor forms a hypothesis that 
must be compared once again with the data, in order 
to fine-tune or correct the diagnosis, in a process 
that Hunter denominates the “diagnostic circle” 2, 
due to its similarity to the hermeneutic circle.  
For Thomasma, the raison d’etre of 
hermeneutics lies in the need for the doctor and 
patient to understand each other across the distance 
that inevitably separates them. Thus, hermeneutics 
is conceived of as an act of interpretation across 
boundaries 3. For the author, ethical judgment 
is included in clinical evaluation, so it is artificial 
to formulate an ethics applied to medicine. This 
rejection of an applied ethics is a general feature of 
all hermeneutic approaches to clinical ethics.
The hermeneutical approach helps us to 
understand how we form a clinical and ethical 
judgment, but it does not tell us which treatment 
is good from a clinical standpoint, nor does it 
guide us about what treatment (or the absence of 
treatment) is good from an ethical point of view. 
Thomasma rejects the decision-making models that 
emerge from both principles and cases. Instead, he 
proposes what he calls ‘contextualism’, which differs 
from casuistry – which in his opinion, depends on 
the theory of natural law 4 – and which starts from 
the basic idea that the context serves to adjust 
values related to concrete circumstances. According 
to Thomasma, there are several factors on which the 
relative weight of values and principles of each case 
depends. 
These factors are, primarily: the medical 
specialty involved; the personal values of the 
patient, their family or social group; the personal 
and professional values of the health personnel, and 
the institutional framework in which the problem 
arises 5. For example, the principle of autonomy will 
have more weight in the context of primary care than 
in tertiary care, where autonomy may be diminished. 
However, this approach is not especially practical. As 
can be imagined, it provides only indications on how 
to make decisions. 
Context (as opposed to applied theories or 
abstract principles) is also a key element in the 
‘interpretive ethics theory’ of Have 6. Here, doctor 
and patient are not beings removed from history or 
culture, but are part of communities in which diverse 
traditions are shared. His interpretive theory aims, 
therefore, to be based on the internal professional 
standards of the practice of care (although without 
neglecting its connection with external morality). This 
theory takes into consideration four parameters 7: 
• The starting point for medical activity is the 
patient’s moral experience. Determining what 
is lacking in this requires interpretation. Firstly, 
because the experience of disease in each 
patient is unique and unrepeatable. Secondly, 
because the contexts of the interpretation 
of doctor and patient are different and, so 
therefore, are their preconceptions; 
• Moral experience primarily involves feelings. 
Only secondarily can these become the object 
of moral reflection. The role of medical ethics 
is not so much to explain and apply ethical 
theories and principles, but to interpret and 
evoke all that encompasses moral experience: 
not only acts and their effects, but also attitudes 
and emotions; 
• Thirdly, the interpretation of a patient’s situation 
is not the individual undertaking of the doctor. 
Instead, the work of physicians is guided by a 
series of cultural assumptions about the nature of 
the world and of the body and the consequence 
of the historical evolution of medical knowledge; 
• Finally, the fact that all interpretation is 
tentative, and that more than one meaning is 
always possible, should not be overlooked.
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From these parameters, it follows that one 
must be aware of the historical determination of all 
understanding. Yet while this may help us discard 
solutions based on unjustified prejudice, it does 
not determine a concrete solution. Have stated that 
dialogue serves to reveal the particularities of our 
prior judgments and, through it, allows us to obtain 
a greater degree of understanding 8. While this is 
correct, it is too generic to solve concrete problems.
Similarly, Leder believes that top-down 
methodologies (such as Kantianism and 
utilitarianism) can obscure the rich complexity of 
cases. Hermeneutics, on the other hand, is capable 
of dealing with multiple contexts, which is its most 
useful feature. In his view, the hermeneutics of the 
twentieth century tends to reject the possibility of 
univocal interpretations, admitting an indefinite 
variety of readings. The hermeneutical approach 
would consist, in his opinion, of listening to the 
voices of all the characters in the drama. 
Specifically, Leder aligns himself with the 
hermeneutics of suspicion in the manner of Ricoeur, 
because, he claims, neither the patient nor the 
physician are aware of the underlying relations 
of power (such as the market, consumerism, and 
gender) 10. Junges proposes completing the casuistic 
approach with a hermeneutics of suspicion that 
interprets the ethical, anthropological and socio-
cultural assumptions that determine how the 
realities of life and health are understood in the 
current society and culture 11.
Seeing social relations in terms of power is 
highly debatable. But even if it were not, it is worth 
asking if all the voices mentioned are equally valid. 
It is also not clear how it is proposed to move from 
careful listening to practice. Leder realizes that one 
cannot remain in an endless state of interpretation, 
but that cases must be resolved. Hermeneutics, he 
says, does not imply relativism. In his view, there 
is a basis for overcoming subjectivity, which is the 
shared tradition. 
He proposes, furthermore, that dialogue allows 
us to become aware of the inevitable prejudices that 
accompany understanding. In a divided society such 
as the west, the hermeneut must contribute to the 
articulation of the perspectives of the participants, 
bringing the different contexts to the debate. His 
role, he says, is not that of a provider of answers, but 
that of a Socratic interlocutor, through the invitation 
to dialogue 12. 
All this is interesting, but insufficient for 
the determination of the correct interpretation. 
Hermeneutics does not provide a method, but an 
awareness of our mediated ability to reach the truth. 
One wonders whether it is necessary to presuppose 
this truth, because, in another case, it may not be 
clear what sense dialogue will have. 
In an even more indeterminate manner, 
Lingiardi and Grieco propose that the doctor should 
become a philosopher 13, and that a true dialogue 
between doctor and patient must be formed. The 
patient cannot be in a position of mere passivity. 
But it is not just about listening to the patient. The 
philosopher’s task is to ask. 
For these authors, it is important to note that 
the doctor shares with the patient a mortal body, 
which is also vulnerable. A doctor ‘with wounds’, 
they say, can activate the healing capacity of the 
patient 14. This goes beyond mere empathy and 
is based on the Platonic idea of the doctor, not 
as someone who dispenses from above, but an 
individual who simply initiates the process of healing 
in another 15. 
In light of the above, we can agree with 
Cadorè, who states that the hermeneutic approach 
to clinical ethics is different from a method for 
solving problems 16. It is significant that Gadamer, 
in The Enigma of Health, refrains completely from 
formulating anything like a method for biomedical 
ethics 17. 
The question of dialogue
According to Gadamer, what the tool of 
method does not achieve must – and really can – be 
achieved by a discipline of asking and inquiring, a 
discipline that guarantees the truth 18. All previous 
hermeneutic approaches emphasize the need for 
the physician and patient to listen to each other. 
But it is an active listening that takes place through 
dialogue. This allows the mutual questioning of 
prejudices that are constitutively linked to any act 
of understanding, and in some cases can distort that 
understanding. 
In fact, through dialogue, the doctor – or 
the patient – is able to understand the motives 
of the patient – or the doctor – and, through 
this understanding, question their own motives, 
discovering the prejudices that have given rise 
to them. This characteristic of dialogue is not 
a psychological opening to the other, which is 
understood as mere empathy, the putting of oneself 
in the place of the other, but is an opening of an 
ontological nature. Svenaeus is right when he states 
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that: truth in Gadamer’s philosophy, however, is to 
be understood primarily as openness to the other 
and his world and not only to my own world 19. 
This statement falls short, however, and reduces 
the Gadamerian approach. Because, radically, it 
is neither my truth nor your truth, but a truth to 
which, despite the inevitable subjective conditions 
of understanding, it is possible to accede in one 
form or another. It is not that I impose myself, or 
that another imposes himself, as in a relationship of 
power. The relationship between doctor and patient 
is not primarily a power relationship. Instead, it is the 
subject matter itself, the truth, that imposes itself. 
That is why Gadamer affirms: undoubtedly 
the important thing for understanding here is still 
understanding the subject matter, the substantive 
insight; It is neither a historical nor a psychological-
genetic procedure 20. And, as he points out in 
another context, understanding a text and agreeing 
in a conversation have something in common: that 
all understandings and agreements have something 
before them; which is that both deal with allowing 
one to talk of the same thing 21. If the patient does 
not have a health problem – in the broadest sense of 
the term – the dialogue between doctor and patient 
(as such) lacks does not make sense.
It is a mistake to think that what is involved in 
understanding is only the revealing of the subjective 
sense of the intention of the author of the text. 
When Gadamer resorts to dialogue and the Socratic 
method of questioning as a way of moving towards 
truth, he does so on the basis of allowing things to 
surface and to assert themselves, when faced with 
the opinions and prejudices that dominate the 
individual 22.
It is not, therefore, correct to reduce 
hermeneutics to a dialogue of perspectives, in 
which doctors, patients, committee members and 
others perform an approximation of positions 
as they reciprocally approach other horizons of 
understanding 23. It is a fact that this occurs. The 
question is why it occurs. In a radical sense, why 
approach what is distant? If all the perspectives, 
such as those of the doctor and the patient, are 
valid, it is congruent to try to impose them because 
they are one’s own. 
If this is not in fact so, it is not because, in the 
Hobbesian manner, discord is replaced by concord 
and war by peace, but because each and every 
one of these perspectives may also be mistaken 
with respect to reality, or biased by prejudices. 
This presupposes that, for many of the aspects 
presented, there is some kind of access, albeit 
partial, to objective truth. 
It is true, as Svenaeus says, that Gadamer does 
not consider the goal of hermeneutic understanding 
the timeless truths that can be attained through a 
universal and timeless method. Truth, Svenaeus 
aptly points out, is always concrete and depends 
on the meeting of two concrete horizons of 
understanding, a meeting that is directed towards 
the accomplishment of an end (goal) 24. This end is 
healing. As healing is a good thing 24 and a morally 
valuable end, the hermeneutics of medicine 
presents a ‘normative structure’.
This approach is clearly Aristotelian. In fact, 
for Aristotle, phronesis or prudence, which is the 
virtue responsible for decisions, is normative 25, 
for the reason just noted. But this virtue, though 
intellectual in nature, is not practicable as it is 
based on moral virtue, as Svenaeus admits. In spite 
of this, and recognizing that the ethics of virtue is 
one of the possibilities of developing an ethics that 
revolves around phronesis, he supports hermeneutic 
phenomenology 26. 
And although he need not, Svaneaus returns 
to the starting point, appealing to dialogue and the 
need for doctors to understand their patients, their 
preferences and their ideas; opening themselves, in 
turn, to their horizons 27,28. For Svenaeus, the ‘good 
hermeneut of medicine’ is phronetic in the sense 
that he or she is dialogically skillful 29. 
But this is a reduction of the Aristotelian 
approach. Unlike Svenaeus’ position 30, medical activity 
does not seem specifically phronetic. It is true that it 
pursues a good end, health, and to this extent is part 
of phronesis. But, as Aristotle teaches, this virtue is not 
directed at a particular good, health for example – as 
expressly stated – but to living well in general 31. 
Moreover, in the light of the Aristotelian 
approach, the individual who must procure health is 
not primarily the doctor, but the patient. As Aristotle 
points out, prudence deliberates on what is good 
and convenient for oneself 31. Similarly, in the world 
of law, the just is the person who wants to give to 
each their own. The jurist is the person who knows 
what is due to each individual. 
Something similar happens in medicine. The 
patient is the one who desires health; the doctor, 
the individual who knows how to recover it. In short, 
medicine participates to some extent as phronesis, 
but for the above reasons – it is directed at a 
particular good and at another subject – it seems to 
be closer to the techne.
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An ontic base
Svenaeus states that: truth in Truth and 
Method is meant as a basic experience of being 
together with others in and through language and 
not as a criterion for the correct interpretation of 
texts 32. This should be further qualified. According 
to Dasein, using Heideggerian terminology, not 
only is ‘being with’ inherent, as Svenaeus points 
out, but also ‘being in the world’, with the sense of 
thrownness or ject in relation to the world 33. 
For Heidegger, ‘to be there with’ is essentially 
already evident in the ‘coencounter’ and in the 
‘counderstanding. 34 To understand the other is not 
so much an understanding of the other, a grasping 
of their subjectivity and eventually a compromise 
with it, as much as an understanding together with 
another, a counderstanding. You cannot understand 
the other if you do not understand the world. The 
world is a criterion of correction.  
Certainly, as Heidegger states, truth is relative 
to Dasein: entities are discovered as soon as Dasein 
is. But Dasein is, at the moment it is constituted by 
the state of openness, essentially in the truth 35. 
Thus, to say that Newton’s laws were not true before 
their formulation by Newton does not mean that 
the entities that these laws discovered did not exist 
before 36. It is thanks to this that an intersubjective 
agreement is possible. 
In the field of the humanities, dialogue is 
directed at the discovery of things. As Gadamer 
points out, in principle understanding means 
understanding one another. It is to begin agreement. 
But agreement is always about something. It tries to 
reach an agreement and this is done remaking the 
way towards the subject. 
The real problem of understanding occurs 
when, in an effort to understand a content, the 
reflective question arises as to how the other 
has come to his or her opinion. To understand, 
the decisive element remains understanding the 
subject matter, the substantive insight; It is neither 
a historical nor an evolutionary-genetic procedure 37. 
Gadamer writes: whenever someone strives to 
understand (...) they are indirectly operating a 
reference to the truth that is hidden in the text 
and must come to light 38. In his view, the aim of all 
understanding and of any consensus based on it is 
agreement on the thing itself. 
Gadamer’s views about the text can equally be 
applied, in the context of a dialogue, to the mutual 
understanding between doctor and patient. The 
text, or the words that these individuals exchange, 
are no longer understood as mere vital expression, 
but are considered seriously in their own claim to 
truth. The symptoms that the patient reports are 
true as they occur in their body. Also, the treatment 
indicated by the doctor is truly good if it is intended 
to cure the patient. 
Therefore, in general, little dialogue between 
doctor and patient is necessary. It is not them, but 
the subjects themselves, that determine agreement. 
Health is an end that qualifies the measures 
conducive to it as truly good. Thus for Aristotle, 
prudence – as far as it serves health in the broader 
context of a good life – is the true and practical 
rational mode of respecting what is good and bad 
for man 39. 
The problem comes with difficult cases. 
In particular, when the patient or his/her 
representatives request a measure contrary to the 
clinical judgment of the physician. It is true, ut supra, 
that it is the patient who has to decide what is good 
in the case of their own health. But it is also true 
that his life is dependent on the doctor, ethically 
speaking, when the latter is doing his job properly. 
That is why conscientious objection is so important. 
In this type of cases, two basic types of good are 
at stake, respectively: health, whether physical or 
spiritual, for one, and his mission for another.
Good is in a varying conflict with will, which 
has to be suitably strengthened with custom so that 
it can operate with phronesis or prudence. Talking of 
‘values’ does not allow us to see this deeper reality. 
The values are abstract and can be assumed like 
someone choosing a product in a catalog. This is not 
realistic. 
Going back to the point of legal comparison, in 
passing just sentences, the judge has firstly to want 
to be just, in the sense that he has this disposition. 
There is no prudence without moral virtue 40. If the 
doctor and the patient are prudent, agreement 
will be easier. If one of the two is not, the subject 
becomes complicated, but that does not mean 
that there is no practical truth, since everything 
that is good can be measured in terms of what 
Aristotle calls things that are good in themselves, 41 
here qualified under current usage as basic human 
goods 42. 
Thus it is found that mere intersubjectivity 
is not enough to escape relativism. As Garcia 
Llerena has pointed out, the only way to escape 
relativism – and also its opposite, absolutism – is 
to turn to an objective and transcultural referent: 
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being. This author advocates a hermeneutic 
ontology that does not attempt to operate with 
objective criteria, a task not yet undertaken in the 
bioethical field 43.
Community and tradition
That practical reasoning finds support in the 
basic human goods that guide it does not mean 
that it provides absolutely objective knowledge. 
Following Heidegger, Gadamer shows that all 
understanding is continuously determined by the 
anticipatory movement of pre-comprehension 44. 
This consists of an anticipation of meaning which 
guides understanding in an inescapable manner, as it 
constitutes a structural ontological moment of such 
comprehension 44. 
Pre-understanding is not merely an act of 
subjectivity, but is determined from the community 
that unites us with tradition. 44 MacIntyre has 
emphasized this aspect, as shown by Gadamer:
What I am, therefore, is in key part what I inherit, 
a specific past that is present to some degree in my 
present. I find myself part of a history and that is 
generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I 
recognize it or not, that I am one of the bearers of 
a tradition 45.
For MacIntyre all reasoning takes place 
within the context of a traditional way of thinking. 
In turn, a tradition is always partially constituted 
by a reasoning about goods, the search for which 
gives that tradition its point and its purpose 45. For 
example, medical tradition involves a continuous 
discussion about what medicine is or should 
be. This has nothing to do with traditionalism, 
since traditions are a living stream, in constant 
transformation. For example, the medical tradition 
has undergone important transformations in 
the last decades, moving from the previously 
accepted paternalism to a growing respect for 
patient autonomy. In short, tradition conditions 
understanding, but, in turn, understanding 
conditions tradition. 
Understanding not only dialogues with a text – 
or a patient – but also establishes a dialogue with 
tradition. This dialogue is not merely theoretical, 
however, but applies to the texts or people we try 
to understand at each moment. As Gadamer says, 
written tradition, from the moment it is deciphered 
and read, is so pure in spirit that it speaks to us as if 
it were current 46. 
This dialogue is enriching because it 
illuminates, hence the importance of training. And 
the humanities are essential for training. A doctor 
with a humanistic background is better prepared 
to make decisions. Undoubtedly, clinical ethics are 
important, but so is the history of medicine and 
the humanities in general. Studies in medicine and 
literature have been introduced in some countries, 
and have proved very useful. This is a point in favor 
of narrative bioethics 47. We often recognize good 
through example. 
As Aristotle teaches: thus although actions 
are entitled just and temperate when they are 
such acts as just and temperate men would do, 
the agent is just and temperate not when he does 
these acts merely, but when he does them in the 
way in which just and temperate men do them 48. It 
has been commonplace since antiquity to describe 
the importance of the narration of events from the 
past to the present. Plutarch, in writing his “Parallel 
Lives”, points out that at the beginning of this work 
he considered others (their lives), but adds: during 
its progress and continuation I have also looked at 
myself 49. Indeed, history is a ‘mirror’ that allows 
one to adorn assimilate their life to each of the 
virtues of others 49. And in the opinion of Julian de 
Toledo, the narration of triumphs comes to the aid of 
virtue, emphasizing in general the importance of the 
narration of the facts of the past for the present 50. 
It is significant that Gadamer considers that 
the humanities are part of moral knowledge 51. In 
fact, the object of the humanities is precisely man 
and what he knows of himself. That is why he states: 
and to understand this [the text and tradition], [the 
interpreter] may not look away from himself and 
the concrete situation in which he finds himself. He 
must relate the text to this situation, if he wants to 
understand at all 52. 
With this reflection, the author is stating that 
the application of a text is not an ultimate and 
eventual part of the phenomenon of comprehension, 
but is determined from the beginning, and from 
the text as a whole 53. Under this presupposition, 
Gadamer considers that when reconstructing the 
old unit of the hermeneutical problem in which 
the jurist, theologian and philologist 54 are found, a 
historian must be added 55. In general, it must be said 
that every reading must contain an application 56.
Commenting on Gadamer, Grondin points 
out that a distinctive feature of humanism is not to 
produce measurable results, but rather to contribute 
to training 57. For Gadamer, training is, together with 
the sensus communis, the capacity for judgment and 
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taste, one of the four basic elements of humanism. 
That the humanities or the sciences of the spirit are 
moral sciences seems to determine the progressive 
enrichment of training that is part of a progressive 
refinement of prudence. In the same way as taste 
or aesthetic sensibility presupposes training, so does 
the capacity for moral judgment. After all, training 
requires memory (a type of selective memory) and 
memory is one of the parts of prudence 58. 
Training is not experience, which is a lived 
knowledge, but it can be updated and refreshed 
like experience if the humanities are seen as moral 
sciences, the understanding of which constitutively 
involves their application to the present. As 
Conill points out, the central concept of training, 
such as the ingredients of practical humanistic 
knowledge (common sense, judgment and taste), 
has a recognized moral significance. This practical 
knowledge has a formative potential that is very 
useful in applied ethics, such as, for example, in the 
training of professionals with a humanist and not 
merely a technicalist sense 59. 
The humanities have the ability to contribute 
to the integral formation of a person and we must 
not forget that, unlike the facere of technology, the 
whole being of a person participates in the agere of 
prudence. Precisely because of this, Aristotle stresses 
the importance of knowledge for the prudent. In a 
general sense, he points out that in every subject 
he carefully judges the individual who is both being 
instructed in that subject and, in an absolute sense, 
being instructed in everything. But he warns that 
when it comes to politics - and here we could include 
ethics - a young man is not an appropriate student, 
since he has no experience of life. He writes: 
Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of 
lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced 
in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions 
start from these and are about these; and, further, 
since he tends to follow his passions, his study will 
be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed 
at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no 
difference whether he is young in years or youthful 
in character; the defect does not depend on time, but 
on his living, and pursuing each successive object, 
as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the 
incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those 
who desire and act in accordance with a rational 
principle knowledge about such matters will be of 
great benefit 60.
Indeed, our judgments not only deal with the 
actions of life, but, as Aristotle asserts, ‘start from 
these’. This refers to virtue, which is formed by habit, 
because, as Stagirite teaches, none of the ethical 
virtues occurs in us through nature, as nothing that 
exists by nature is modified by custom 61. As such, 
through practicing justice, we become justice; virile, 
by practicing virility 62. 
But if we have not attained virtue, knowledge 
does not profit. That is why we will not make good 
politicians: neither the young man, who lacks 
maturity in virtue, nor the incontinent or wanton 
man, who has formed the habit of contrariness. As 
Aristotle states elsewhere, the incontinent and the 
bad man obtain from reasoning that which they 
propose to see, so that they will have consulted 
rightly, but have procured for themselves a great 
evil. But to have consulted well appears to be a 
certain good, for such a rectitude of consultation, 
as becomes the mean of obtaining good, is good 
consultation 63. Aristotle argues that he who makes 
use of knowledge in practical matters is one who 
guides his actions and his desires according to 
reason, and this is prudence 64.
Final considerations
There is a hermeneutic dimension to the 
doctor-patient relationship. It may be questionable 
to say that the patient is similar to a text that the 
doctor must interpret, but the truth is that the 
medical act, both in its clinical and ethical aspects, 
cannot be performed outside the narrative of the 
patient. The hermeneutical approach helps us 
to understand how we form clinical and ethical 
judgment, but just as it does not tell us which 
treatment is good from a clinical standpoint, so it 
does not guide us about what treatment (or the 
absence of) is good from an ethical point of view. It 
is therefore difficult, unlike what some hermeneutic 
approaches claim, to replace the usual decision-
making models by a methodological scheme inspired 
by hermeneutics.
The aforementioned hermeneutic perspectives 
do not have at their disposal the tool of method, 
but the tool of dialogue, which occupies a central 
place in all such approaches. Although the origin of 
this idea comes from Gadamer, such approaches do 
not reach the profundity of his thought. In fact, it is 
not only a matter of being open to another and to 
his or her truth, in the sense of not imposing one’s 
own truth, and being able to discover one’s own 
prejudices, but, from a more radical point of view, 
of the subject itself. In fact, for Heidegger, Dasein 
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is not only inherent in “being with”, but also in 
“being-in-the-world”, in the sense of thrownness or 
ject in relation to the world. Therefore, one cannot 
understand another if one does not understand the 
world. For this reason, for Aristotle, prudence is a 
practical, truthfully rational form of being in terms 
of what is good and bad for man.
All understanding is determined by the 
anticipatory movement of pre-understanding. This 
is not a mere act of subjectivity, but is determined 
from the community that unites us with tradition. 
In understanding, one does not only dialogue with 
a text – or a patient – but also with tradition. It is 
a dialogue that enhances understanding and shows 
the importance of humanistic training for the 
prudent individual who must make decisions. It is 
not without reason that the humanities form part of 
moral knowledge.
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Competition. I would like to thank Professors José Antonio Seoane, Viviana García Llerena and Carolina Pereira for their 
enriching observations
Referências
1. Gadamer H-G. El estado oculto de la salud. Barcelona: Gedisa; 1996. p. 115-6.
2. Hunter KM. Doctor’s stories: the narrative structure of medical knowledge. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press; 1991. p. 9.
3. Thomasma DC. Clinical ethics as medical hermeneutics. Theor Med Bioeth. 1994;15(2):93-111. 
p. 95.
4. Thomasma DC. Op. cit.  p. 98.
5. Thomasma DC. Op. cit.  p. 100.
6. Ten Have H. The hyperreality of clinical ethics: a unitary theory and hermeneutics. Theor Med 
Bioeth. 1994;15(2):113-31. p. 118-9.
7. Ten Have H. Op. cit. p. 125-7.
8. Ten Have H. Op. cit. p. 127.
9. Leder D. Toward a hermeneutical bioethics. In: DuBose ER, Hamel R, O’Connell LJ, editors. A 
matter of principle? Ferment in US bioethics. Valley Forge: Trinity Press International; 1994. 
p. 251.
10. Leder D. Op. cit. p. 252-3. 
11. Junges JR. Bioética como casuística e como hermenéutica. Rev Bras Bioética. 2005 [acesso 20 jul 
2016];1(1):41. Disponível: http://bit.ly/2sLHUIX
12. Leder D. Op. cit. 255.
13. Lingiardi V, Grieco A. Hermeneutics and the philosophy of medicine: Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
platonic metaphor. Theor Med Bioeth. 1999;20(5):413-22. p. 419.
14. Lingiardi V,  Grieco A. Op cit. p. 419-20.
15. Lingiardi V,  Grieco A. Op. cit. p. 413.
16. Cadorè B. A hermeneutical approach to clinical bioethics. In: Viafora C. Clinical bioethics: a search 
for the foundations. Dordrecht: Springer; 2005. p. 56.
17. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 1996. p. 116.
18. Gadamer H-G. Verdad y método. Salamanca: Sígueme; 2012. p. 585.
19. Svenaeus F. Hermeneutics of medicine in the wake of Gadamer: the issue of phronesis. Theor 
Med Bioeth. 2003;24(5):414.
20. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 2012. p. 236.
21. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 2012. p. 457.
22. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 2012. p. 556.
23. Svenaeus F. Hermeneutics of clinical practice: the question of textuality. Theor Med Bioeth. 
2000;21(2):171-89. p. 181-3.
24. Svenaeus F. Op. cit. 2003. p. 417.
25. Aristóteles. Ética a Nicómaco. Madrid: Gredos; 2010. Libro VI, 10, 1143a8-9.
26. Svenaeus F. Op. cit. 2003. p. 425.
27. Svenaeus F. Op. cit. 2003. p. 426. 
28. Svenaeus F. Op. cit. 2000. p. 178. 
29. Svenaeus F. Op. cit. 2003. p. 421.
30. Aristóteles. Op. cit. Libro VI, 5, 1140a25-27.
31. Svenaeus F. Op. cit. 2000. p. 180.
32. Heidegger M. Ser y tiempo. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica; 1971. p. 152.
U
pd
at
e
263Rev. bioét. (Impr.). 2017; 25 (2): 255-63
Hermeneutics and decision making in clinical ethics
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1983-80422017252185
33. Heidegger M. Op. cit. p. 181.
34. Heidegger M. Op. cit. p. 247.
35. Heidegger M. Op. cit. p. 248.
36. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit.; 2012. p. 236.
37. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit.; 2012. p. 239.
38. Aristóteles. Op. cit. Libro VI, 5, 1140b4-5.
39. Aristóteles. Op. cit. Libro VI, 13, 1144b31-2.
40. Aristóteles. Op. cit. Libro I, 6, 1096b16.
41. Finnis J. Nature and natural law in contemporary philosophical and theological debates: some 
observations. In: Vial Correa JD, Sgreccia E, editors. The nature and dignity of the human person 
as the foundation of the right to life: the challenges of the contemporary cultural context. 
Vatticano: Lib. Ed. Vatticana; 2003. p. 82-4.
42. García Llerena V. De la bioética a la biojurídica: el principialismo y sus alternativas. Granada: 
Comares; 2012. p. 152, 154.
43. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 2012. p. 363.
44. MacIntyre A. Tras la virtud. Barcelona: Austral; 2013. p. 273.
45. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 2012. p. 216. 
46. Vergara O. Some notes on the contribution of the narrative approach to the decision making 
process in healthcare ethics, pro manuscripto: 6-10. (mímeo)
47. Aristóteles. Op. cit.  Libro II, 4, 1105b7-8.
48. Plutarco. Vidas paralelas. Madrid: Calpe; 1919. t.III, p. 177.
49. Toledo J de. The history of Wamba: Julians of Toledo´s historia Wambae regis. Washington: 
Catholic University of America; 2005. p. 178-9.
50. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 2012. p. 386.
51. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 2012. p. 396.
52. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 2012. p. 378 ss.
53. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 2012. p. 401. 
54. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 2012. p. 413-14.
55. Gadamer H-G. Op. cit. 2012. p. 413.
56. Grondin J. ¿Qué es la hermenéutica? Barcelona: Herder; 2008. p. 72.
57. Tomás de Aquino. Suma de teología, II-II, q. 49, a. Regentes EPDE. Madrid: BAC; 2006-2010.
58. Conill J. Ética hermenéutica: crítica desde la facticidad. Madrid: Tecnos; 2006. p. 190.
59. Aristóteles. Op. cit. 1095a3-11.
60. Aristóteles. Op. cit. Libro II, 1, 1103a20-22. 
61. Aristóteles. Op. cit. Libro II, 1, 1103a34-35. 
62. Aristóteles. Op. cit. Libro VI, 9, 1142b19-23. 
63. Vergara O. Ética biomédica y prudencia. Cuadernos de Bioética. 2015;26(87):267-77.
Recebido:  9.8.2016
Revisado: 14.2.2017
Aprovado: 24.2.2017
U
pd
at
e
